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Abstract. In the animation and design of cartoon characters, animators have often 
turned to the study of biological theories and observation of human actors and animals 
to capture lifelike movements and emotions more successfully. Charles Darwin’s 
principle of antithesis, as one of the principles he considered to be responsible for the 
expression of emotions in animals, would seem to be of distinctive importance in the 
development of animation. By revisiting Darwin’s original idea in the context of the 
principles of animation formulated by Thomas and Johnston, we are able to assess its 
application and relevance in the expressions of emotions in cartoon animal characters. 
The article concentrates on the emotive function of animal social communication as 
outlined in zoosemiotics, while taking into account that the expressions of animal 
characters are directed at the viewer. The principle of antithesis, as a descriptive tool, 
aids us in considering the diversity of modalities used simultaneously in affective 
communication, and serves to explicate human interpretations of the anthropomorphic 
and zoomorphic projections onto the behaviour of cartoon animal characters. This 
paper offers insight into the potential expansion and re-evaluation of unattested 
principles in animation, which can be utilized by animators in the creation of more 
dynamic and expressive animated characters. 
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Introduction
It has always been an objective in animation to create compelling and emotionally 
expressive characters. To achieve a lifelike quality, animators often utilize the 
study and observation of live animals or anatomical structures (O’Neill 2008: 
25–29). However, there is a noticeable tendency to caricature the animal, as “real 
animals cannot act or emote as broadly as animators require” (Thomas, Johnston 
1981: 333). In order to address this, a set of principles to create “believable” facial 
expressions and bodily movement in animated characters has been established 
(Beck 2011; MacWilliams 2014). The principles were first explicitly stated in the 
chapter “The principles of animation” of Thomas and Johnston’s The Illusion of 
Life: Disney Animation (Thomas, Johnston 1981: 47–70). The outlined principles 
mostly deal with designing the characters to express emotions, the development 
of personality, as well as capturing these elements in the form and structure of a 
given character. The principles were aimed at capturing a so-called “illusion of 
life”, which largely means believability behind the transmission and expression of 
emotions:
Our goal with these studies is to make the audience feel the emotions of the 
characters, rather than appreciate them intellectually. We want our viewers not 
merely to enjoy the situation with a murmured, “isn’t he cu-ute?” but really to feel 
something of what the character is feeling. (Th omas, Johnston 1981: 22)
Though not explicitly stated, clear connections can be drawn between this classic 
theory of animation and prominent biological theories of the early 20th century 
in their approach to emotions and gestures (Steinberg 2014: 288). Charles Darwin 
was a pioneer in discussing the evolution of outward appearance of affective states 
in his 1872 book Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals. He brought out 
three general principles which explain “[…] most of the expressions and gestures 
involuntarily used by man and the lower animals, under the influence of various 
emotions and sensations” (Darwin 1872: 27). These three principles are clearly 
listed as “[…] the principle of serviceable associated Habits” (i.e. when a certain 
state of mind induces some sort of expression and when a similar – even feeble – 
emotion is induced, then the force of habit encourages for the same expression to 
emerge); “[…] the principle of Antithesis” (i.e. opposite states of minds induce 
expressions that appear in directly opposite forms); and “[…] the principle of 
actions due to the constitution of the Nervous System independently from […] 
Will, and independently to a certain extent of Habit” (i.e. direct action of the 
nervous system) (Darwin 1872: 28–29). Although Darwin considered that the 
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three principles may operate together to produce a bodily expression (Darwin 
1872: 82), we shall turn our attention to the principle of antithesis as a descriptive 
mechanism. This is due to the fact that when Darwin explained this principle, 
he restricted himself mainly to animals other than humans and used it to 
illustrate the communication of emotion, making this principle, in our view, quite 
compatible with the ethological zoosemiotic approach, where “[…] signification, 
communication and representation within and across animal species” (Maran et 
al. 2011: 1) are a focal point.
Already Darwin began some exploratory research as to the extension of his 
theories in the representation of emotion in art, particularly in the expressions of 
classic paintings and sculptures. He found that these pieces prioritized beauty over 
the expression of emotion and did not capture realistic anatomical expression: 
I had hoped to derive much aid from the great masters in painting and sculpture, 
who are such close observers. Accordingly, I have looked at photographs and 
engravings of many well-known works; but, with a few exceptions, have not thus 
profi ted. Th e reason no doubt is, that in works of art, beauty is the chief object; 
and strongly contracted facial muscles destroy beauty. Painters can hardly portray 
suspicion, jealousy, envy, except by the aid of accessories which tell the tale; and 
poets use such vague and fanciful expressions as “green-eyed jealousy”. (Darwin 
1872: 14–15)
As our interpretation of Darwin’s description of classic art and sculpture would 
lead us to believe, these traditional artistic genres failed to capture antithesis in 
their expressions. Since his time, significant technological and artistic develop-
ments, particularly the emergence of animation, have enhanced the possibility to 
affect audiences’ emotions without human actors (Bates 1994). This argument is 
also shared by Thomas and Johnston when discussing the expression of emotion 
in classic art. They state that “[...] since that time, we have been inundated with 
artists’ attempts to shape something in clay or stone or paint that has a life of 
its own [...] and in the late 1800s new inventions seemed to make it possible” 
(Thomas, Johnston 1981: 13). 
Along with the growth in popularity of animation, we also saw the rise of the 
animal character, with many of the most successful animated animal characters 
achieving global recognition (e.g. Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, and Goofy) 
(Brockway 1989). These animal characters captured the imaginations and hearts 
of audiences with their expressive characterizations and can still be seen as a 
dominating force in modern animation today. 
This raises the question as to what extent applying antithesis, as posited by 
Darwin, is appropriate in the context of animated animal characters. This article 
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is not the first to utilize Darwinian approaches in the understanding of animal 
characters in animation. Film theorist Barbara Creed (2009) used Darwin’s 
Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals in her analysis of animal characters 
elaborating that
[...] the screen animal is a technological fi gure, its meaning and signifi cance are 
diff erent from those of actual animals – it signifi es far more that the “world of 
nature” or feelings of sympathy or protectiveness towards the animal [...]. In 
darwinian terms, the screen animal signifi es the collapse of boundaries between 
human and animal [...]. (Creed 2009: 175–178) 
However, in her analysis Creed does not examine the emotive expressions of these 
characters or the presence of antithesis, but rather focuses on the cultural impact 
of these characters, arguing that animal characters, or “screen animals”, tend to 
undermine anthropocentric views of the world (Creed 2009: 174–178). While her 
approach offers interesting insights into film theory and cultural studies, she only 
establishes a casual link to Darwin’s theories, and does not mention or analyse 
the principles themselves, which may hold importance to the field of animation 
as they influence how animators engage in reference in the development of 
characters.
The aim of this article is to find out what techniques are utilized to create an 
expressive function in animated characters and whether these techniques have 
some grounding in the principle of antithesis. To reach our goal, we set out to 
investigate whether opposite emotions are expressed in antithetical forms in the 
animation of animal characters in comparison to real animals. Thus, we will 
analyse whether Darwin’s claim that antithesis is one of the governing principles 
of emotional expression still holds ground close to 150 years later, with the 
advancement of scientific knowledge on animal behaviour and the progress of 
technology (e.g. the appearance of animated movies and cartoons). We strive to 
determine whether we can draw parallels between general mammalian expression 
and the expression of animated characters to see if antithetical expressions (e.g. 
in body posture, movement, elicited sound) align with communicative intent 
and expression, or whether antithesis, as a descriptive tool, stems rather from an 
anthropocentric understanding of animal communication. 
In our endeavour we will rely on a semiotic approach that incorporates two 
branches of zoosemiotics, i.e. we will juxtapose the views of ethological and 
anthropological zoosemiotics through the principle of antithesis. Thus, we have 
the possibility to consider not only animal communication (in the broadest 
sense), but also our representations of other species as seen in animated animal 
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characters. In analysing antithesis, we emphasize the aspect of communication 
between animals and the rather one-way communication between animal 
cartoon characters and human viewers. We shall also employ the analytical 
potential of Uexküll’s concept of umwelt (e.g. Uexküll 1982, 1992) to examine 
the expressions of emotion as intra- and interspecific communicative signs, and 
utilize a semiotic typology established by Dagmar Schmauks (2000) to investigate 
the communicative intent behind the creation of animated animal characters. We 
shall also review more recent ethological studies, i.e. research carried out after 
Darwin posited the principle of antithesis (which is often tied to his studies on 
communication) to determine the applicability of the principle of antithesis in 
animals. However, we do not wish to underplay the importance of Darwin himself, 
because we believe it to still hold true that “[…] developments in the study of 
animal communication stem largely from Charles Darwin” (Sebeok 1972: 64). 
Thus, it is his legacy we wish to scrutinize in more detail and, if possible, to extend 
the relevance of Darwin’s theories by drawing parallels between his principle of 
antithesis and the principles of animation introduced in Thomas, Johnston 1981. 
In doing so, this research will offer insight into the foundations of animation 
which can aid animators in achieving a higher degree of expressive realism in 
character design. 
1. On the concept of emotion
In order to draw a link between the principle of antithesis and the emotional 
expression of animated characters, the concept of emotion must first be dealt with. 
Darwin does not define the concept of emotion, and he often uses it in tandem 
with the concept of sensation. Only as a footnote does he refer to Herbert Spencer, 
stating that Spencer has “[…] drawn a clear distinction between emotions and 
sensations, the latter being ‘generated in our corporeal framework’” (Darwin 1872: 
27), without any indication as to an explanation of emotion. To complicate the 
matter even further, Darwin often employs the concept of feeling as synonymous 
to emotion and frequently refers to emotions as mental states. It must be stated that 
Darwin is not the only one who takes the term ‘emotion’ to be self-explanatory, 
especially when it comes to describing the expressions of other animals besides 
humans. Within the relevant literature on animal behaviour and communication 
there are plenty of instances where even contemporary authors, while discussing 
emotions in animals, do not deem it necessary to define this concept and opt for 
either identifying and naming different existent emotions or simply stating that 
emotions are affective states (e.g. Dawkins 2000; Mellor 2012; Wilkins et al. 2015).
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We acknowledge that in animal social communication many messages serve to 
alert the communication partner about the emotional condition of the signalling 
individual and may thus be considered as serving an emotive function (Sebeok 
1972: 73). There are also other contemporary authors who claim that emotions 
probably have a connection with majority of animal behavioural messages such 
as aggression, fear, affiliation, etc. (Snowdon 2003). However, there still is no 
commonly agreed upon definition of ‘emotion’ and the proposed definitions 
vary greatly between disciplines. It is clear that defining emotions is not an easy 
task, because “[…] on the one hand, they seem self-evident and obvious when 
examined introspectively; on the other hand, they have been extremely difficult 
to define in objective scientific terms” (Anderson, Adolph 2014: 187). In addition, 
in the relevant scientific literature, there seems to be a confusion between 
relatively close concepts, such as ‘emotions’, ‘affects’, ‘feelings’, e.g. primary affects 
(Tomkins, McCarter 1964) include six basic emotions (e.g. Ekman 1992, 1999). 
We are not the first ones to try and delineate the meaning of “emotion” (see e.g. 
Bekoff 2000; Russell 2003; Ott 2017; Anderson, Adolph 2014). A relatively recent 
theoretical overview (Ott 2017) distinguishes two main perspectives on dealing 
with emotions, where one of them is concerned with humanities and philosophy 
and the other perspective is occupied with psychology and neuroscience1. The 
Darwinian tradition is rather reflected in the latter, together with later develop-
ments by Ekman (e.g. 2006), Feldman Barrett (2011), Damasio and Carvalho 
(2013), Tomkins (Tomkins, McCarter 1964), and Panksepp (e.g. 1998).2 
Finding a new definition for ‘emotion’ falls beyond the scope of this article, but 
we would like to continue our analysis with more clarity. We analyse mainly those 
instances which are compatible with Darwin’s general treatment of emotions. This 
means that we are satisfied with the characterization of emotion as offered by 
Anderson and Adolph (2014), who proposed that emotions (caused by internal 
or external stimuli) cause several responses simultaneously (e.g. observed 
behaviour, cognitive changes, somatic responses, and others) that include external 
and internal feedback elements for the animal. This description is sufficient for 
our endeavour to discuss antithetical expressions of emotions in animals, i.e. 
it is applicable in an interspecific manner (i.e. suitable for analysing also other 
species besides humans) and the description includes the expressive nature of 
emotion (i.e. not simply a ‘private sensation’ that remains only in the recognition 
of the individual). We will add on our part, that the expression of an emotion, as 
Darwin most often viewed it, has a communicative function (i.e. it has a social 
1 Th e author also tackles a third direction, which pursues to unite the two.
2 However, some of these authors are rather human-centred when dealing with emotions.
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dimension),3 and we will limit (most of our examples and analysis) to instances 
that could also be considered in the framework of the principle of antithesis. 
It should be noted that Darwin took it for granted that animals have emotions, 
such as rage, astonishment, terror, joy, anger, etc. He even stated that in “[…] 
animals we see the same principle of pleasure derived from contact in association 
with love” (Darwin 1872: 215). Similarly, a hundred years later, Lorenz believed 
animals to be capable of love and accompanying feelings, such as jealousy. Lorenz 
believed that animal emotions were analogous to human feelings:
When we speak of falling in love, of friendship, of personal enmity or of jealousy 
in these or other animals, we are not guilty of anthropomorphism. Th ese terms 
refer to functionally determined concepts, just as do the terms legs, wings, eyes, 
and the names used for other bodily structures that have evolved independently 
in diff erent phyla of animals. (Lorenz 1981: 91)
We acknowledge that someone researching animal emotions might run into 
difficulties when trying to pinpoint some exact emotions (e.g. hope, pride, pity, 
etc.) for some species with relatively simple umwelten, but succeed with species 
with more complex umwelten. For example, already in the 1930s ethologists used 
the term ‘boredom’ to describe mammals’ and birds’ behaviour in the context of 
the zoo (see e.g. Burn 2017). In the case of cartoon characters as they are often 
anthropomorphized, projected emotions can be pinpointed more exactly as they 
often parallel human emotions. 
Darwin also recognized the importance of the emotive function of emotions, 
i.e. “[w]ith social animals, the power of intercommunication between the 
members of the same community, – and with other species, between the opposite 
sexes, as well as between the young and the old, – is of the highest importance to 
them” (Darwin 1872: 60). In addition, emotions can also be seen as an organizing 
principle of social communication in animals (Kull 2018). With highly social 
animals it is essential that the expressions of emotions (or any behaviour, for 
that matter) are interpreted by the communication partner in the way intended 
to avoid mistakes in communication. Understanding the emotions of others is 
closely tied to the capacity of empathy, which should increase the cooperation 
between conspecifics (Kull 2018). This, however, presupposes that emotions 
are indeed correctly understood. The prevention of mistakes and reduction of 
ambiguity might be considered the reason why some of the expressions of emotion 
3 Th is view has also gained support from other authors, who similarly state that certain 
behavioural expressions are not signs of emotions unless this behaviour is necessary for social 
communication (Feldman Barrett 2011).
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are distinctive in their form (Morris 1957) and emotions of opposite valence, i.e. 
negative versus positive, may in some cases also take opposite forms. This is also 
evident in semiotic enquiries, where the oppositional forces of attraction and 
repulsion, as related to emotions of fear and anger in the case of fight or flight 
response, are seen as leading from biosemiosis to psychosemiosis (Nöth 1994: 
53). So, valence is one of the defining aspects of emotions (Russell 2003) that also 
prove to be important when discussing the principle of antithesis.
2. The principle of antithesis in animal communication
As stated in the introduction, Darwin regards the principle of antithesis to be 
based on opposition. To elaborate, from his description it is evident that antithesis 
is synonymous with binary opposition, an idea that has found support in semiotics, 
where the ‘biopolarity’ (i.e. the oppositional character of spatial movement of 
animals), or the oppositional nature of emotions, is discussed (e.g. Nöth 1994), 
although no reference to Darwin is made.
It is obvious that antithesis is a purely descriptive mechanism. This means that 
it does not have a self-reflexive character for the animal expressing oneself, i.e. we 
do not expect the animals to have any kind of perception of diametrically opposite 
emotions. Clearly, Darwin did not consider antithetical expressions to be part of 
animal’s ‘intended’ behaviour either, stating that he did not believe that his “[…] 
dog voluntarily put on his dejected attitude and ‘hot-house face,’ which formed so 
complete a contrast to his previous cheerful attitude and whole bearing” (Darwin 
1872: 67). This is not to claim, though, that binary oppositions of this type have no 
place as an analytical tool in characterizing animal behaviour and communication. 
We have established that there are some oppositional ‘roots’ of animal emotions, 
but there is no need to impose the necessity of self-reflection.
The principle of antithesis as an analytical tool is attractive, but it does have its 
imperfections, e.g. Darwin’s examples of antithesis are primarily instances which 
allow for the animal’s whole bearing to reverse. We need to stress that it is certain 
that often animal emotions cannot be considered as belonging to extremities, 
e.g. the dog described by Darwin (1872: 57–60) can sometimes be a little excited 
about going for a walk and sometimes very excited. So, the second defining aspect 
of emotions, besides valence is intensity (Russell 2003), sometimes also called 
gradedness (Nöth 1994). Thus, animals’ (including humans’) emotions are rather 
fluid, flexible and dynamic. Animals’ expressions of emotions tend to fall more to 
the extremes in intense situations, e.g. “[…] we must remember that the capacity 
of maximum movement of animals in a balanced mental state is far less than that 
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which occurs under conditions of extreme excitement, and in exceptional instances” 
(Hediger 1964[1950]: 53). Thus, the intensity of an emotion is context-dependent. 
The extreme expressions of emotions in a social context can be seen as imparting 
an important message that is unambiguous, attention-grasping, and fast, e.g. intense 
aggression by attack or a mating-call induced by high state of arousal.
Darwin’s antithesis principle has also been criticized for having been used in 
instances that would better be explained by a more universal approach “[...] of 
pleasure sought or pain avoided” (Bruce 1883: 615), i.e. according to only the 
valence of the emotion. Indeed, if we reconsider Darwin’s own examples about 
the aggressive (or angry) and loving (or joyful) dog, it is clear that these emotions, 
although expressed in ways that could be seen as opposites, are not opposing 
according to more contemporary and widely accepted wheel of emotions (Plutchik 
1980). The opposite of anger or aggression is fear. However, it is true that the 
valences of the emotions that Darwin regarded, are exactly the opposites, with 
aggression or anger having a very clear negative valence and affective or joyful 
feelings having an unmistakable positive valence. This leads us to side with the 
developments in animal studies which re-emphasize that valence and intensity 
or degree of arousal are extremely important in animal emotion research (Mendl 
et al. 2010), but we also acknowledge that relying only on valence and intensity 
in any animal behaviour analysis would be oversimplifying the emotional variety 
exhibited by different species. Also, a series of problems arise when describing the 
expressions as indicative of a concrete emotion, which requires, as we have also 
stated, an adequate knowledge of ethology in order to pinpoint an exact emotion 
to a behaviour (Campbell 1997). 
With the development of ethology and studies in animal communication, it is 
understandable that not everyone shares Darwin’s views. However, there are also 
authors who strongly support Darwin’s approach, claiming that even today his 
findings serve as a model for studying emotional expressions; that his principle 
of antithesis is well applicable to examine the expression of fear and threat (in 
both the vocal and visual modalities) in several species (Snowdon 2003); that 
the principle of antithesis is promising and deserves more attention than it has 
received since Darwin first proposed it (Parkinson 2005). Nevertheless, antithesis 
has not been systematically researched – there are only brief mentions of it from 
the second half of last century; nor have there been attempts to test its relevance 
(Thierry 2010)4. Still, Darwin was successful in inspiring the study of emotion 
in humans. His ideas were the basis for Ekman’s creation of the typology of six 
4 Th ierry (2010) also states that Darwin’s ideas about the expressions of emotions did not 
have substantial infl uence on the biology of behaviour.
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basic emotions, which are largely thought to be universal (Ekman 1992, 2006)5. 
Facial expressions, as supported by the basic emotions, have been relatively well 
studied in humans (e.g. Brinke et al. 2012; Ekman 2006; Parkinson 2005) but 
attempts have also been made to study them in other primates (e.g. Kanazawa 
1996; Chevalier-Skolnikoff 2006; Waller, Micheletta 2013). We would like to 
reiterate that the approach of considering only certain aspects of communication 
(i.e. the appearance of the face) does not coincide with Darwin’s approach of using 
multimodal ways of communication. The reduction of emotional expressions to 
only the face – regardless of the prevalent utilization of the visual communication 
channel by humans – diminishes the general appeal that was present in Darwin’s 
study. The same idea is echoed elsewhere: “[…] one value of studying a variety 
of nonhuman animals is to emphasize the diversity of modalities of affective 
communication available (such as olfactory signals that have received little 
attention in human studies)” (Snowdon 2003: 463). This issue was also addressed 
by Hediger (1968), who has provided an extensive list of ways and channels for 
animal expression, including instances of expression of emotion.
We have discussed the possible applicability of the principle of antithesis in 
animals; however, we must acknowledge that the principle of antithesis in animal 
expressions of emotions is highly conditional, i.e. conclusions as to what extent 
the principle of antithesis is applicable depend on the species, concrete emotions 
and our knowledge of the animal, population or species. We are confident in 
stating that since the (possible) expression of antithetical emotions serves a 
communicative function, it can mostly be present in social animals with complex 
umwelten that create complex social relations and need to express themselves in 
a manner that is directed at clarity and avoiding errors in communication and 
mutual understanding. We also believe that the antitheses exhibit themselves 
in cases where the valence of the emotional state is very clear (i.e. positive or 
negative) and also the intensity on the emotion is high as well. 
We need to stress, once again, the difficulties between intra- and interspecies 
interpretation and recognition of emotions and thus emphasize the need for 
further studies in animal emotions. This also raises a question as to whether the 
communication of antithetical emotions is limited to interspecies communication, 
or if these expressions can be interpreted in the expressions of non-biological 
beings. With regard to animal characters the communicative function of emotions 
only holds true for the receiver, i.e. the human viewing the cartoon. Darwin’s 
(1872) principles of habitation and action of the nervous system refer to the 
5 However, there are some authors who disagree about the existence of basic emotions 
(Ortony, Turner 1990; Jack et al. 2012).
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anatomical stimuli and ingrained actions of the animal, these anatomical 
principles, while referred to in the design of characters (Su, Zhao 2011), are not 
present within animated characters. Thus, the intent of animators in “imitating 
life” is to create characters that evoke emotions in an audience (Dias, Paiva 
2005). In doing so, the social dimension is distorted, i.e. humans (animators) 
express certain emotions through animal characters to other humans (viewers) 
(Buchanan 2007: 77). The emotive function not only regulates the social relations 
or encounters between the characters of the cartoon, but also between the character 
and the viewer (Bates 1994). Thus, the key point of the analysis at hand is not about 
the emotional expression or projected state of the character itself, but rather the 
audience’s perception of these effective states, and whether these expressions present 
antithetical qualities, and, if so, what techniques are utilized to achieve this. 
3. The principles of animation
In the development of the principles of animation, Disney animation paid parti-
cular attention to the capabilities that the medium afforded them:
An artist could represent the actual fi gure, if he chose, meticulously capturing its 
movements and actions. Or he could caricature it, satirize it, ridicule it. And he 
was not limited to mere actions; he could show emotions, feelings, even innermost 
fears. (Th omas, Johnston 2018: 16)
While it can be suggested that often the expression of emotion is at the heart 
of any art form, animation sought to codify this concept in conjunction with 
biological and scientific concepts. Disney’s animators aimed to achieve this life-
like expression of emotions with their principles of animation. This ideology 
is highlighted by one of the principles, appeal, which refers to the quality of 
likeability of the character established through the combination of the other 
principles (Luhta, Roy 2012: 32). This does not mean appeal in the sense of being 
generally attractive, but rather the ability to evoke emotions in the audience in 
general. The appeal and emotive ability of a character is not limited to its design; 
rather, it is holistic in nature, including the character’s body movement, facial 
expressions, voice, etc., which corresponds with Darwin’s implicit multimodal 
approach to the expression of emotion (Darwin 1872). 
The first proposed principle is squash and stretch. This is based on the idea that 
organisms made of living flesh show changes in shapes (squashing and stretching) 
along with corresponding muscle movements as a response to pressure and force 
(Thomas, Johnston 1981:48–52). When a force acts on a given object it is squashed, 
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while an object that is moving or being pulled will be stretched. In the expression 
of status or sensation in humans we can see this idea of squash and stretch in a 
few forms, e.g. a person who is shocked or threatened in a situation may assume a 
more rigid body posture, while someone who is sad or afraid may take a droopier 
or curled up posture (Kwon, Lee 2011). Viewing this from a semiotic vantage 
point, we can note that 
[…] spatial semiosis assigns preferential values to directions, such as the vertical 
and the horizontal. Furthermore, whenever signs are part of an oppositional 
paradigm, such as verbal opposites up vs. down, these can be graded (as in further 
up/down) and allow for a local tertium (as neither up, nor down). (Nöth 1994: 51)
Similarly, Darwin, when describing the principle of antithesis with the example of 
a dog, addresses this opposition in body posture, stating that when the dog has a 
“hostile frame of mind” in approaching a human, the dog 
[...] walks upright and very stiffl  y; his head is slightly raised, or not much lowered; 
the tail is held erect and quite rigid; the hairs bristle, especially along the neck 
and back; the pricked ears are directed forwards, and the eyes have a fi xed stare. 
(Darwin 1872: 50)
The dog may also growl and expose his teeth. However, when he is in an affectio-
nate state the dog’s
[...] whole bearing is reversed. Instead of walking upright, the body sinks 
downwards or even crouches, and is thrown into fl exuous movements; his tail, 
instead of being held stiff  and upright, is lowered and wagged from side to side; his 
hair instantly becomes smooth; his ears are depressed and drawn backwards, but 
not closely to the head; and his lips hang loosely. (Darwin 1872: 51) 
Darwin describes, in a similar manner, a hostile and affective cat (Darwin 1872: 
56–57). While a clear parallel can be seen from the principle, Thomas and 
Johnston also bring in their own explication of this idea in describing the emotive 
ability of a dog stating that: “[t]here is no doubt when a dog is ashamed, or proud 
or playful, or sad (or belligerent, sleepy, disgusted, indignant). He speaks with his 
whole body in both attitude and movement” (Thomas, Johnston 1981: 19).
While the general rigidity or looseness of posture play a role in the expression 
of emotion, both Darwin as well as Thomas and Johnston note the importance 
of the multimodality of expressions. In animation additional emphasis is placed 
on capturing the behavioural realism of actions, resulting in the principle of 
secondary action, which posits that no action is completed in isolation, but rather 
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there are always secondary actions and movements accompanying a primary 
action (Thomas, Johnston 1981: 65). The addition of secondary actions seeks to 
increase the behavioural realism of characters (Luhta, Roy 2012: 22), so that sad 
characters would not simply cry, but may rub their eyes, tilt their heads down, 
or turn their backs. This principle again highlights the acknowledgement of the 
multimodality of expressions. In his discussion of the principle of action of the 
nervous system Darwin explains that, “[t]he facial and respiratory muscles, which 
will be apt to be first brought into action; then those of the upper extremities, 
next those of the lower, and finally those of the whole body” (Darwin 1872: 71). 
The principle of secondary action is additionally supported by follow through and 
overlapping action, which emphasizes that a given movement will in turn lead to 
subsequent movements, which add additional emphasis to the overall affective 
intent (Thomas, Johnston 1981: 53).
In this way, animators pay particular attention to the intensity and valence 
of an action, while these are also as relevant in the expressions of emotions in 
real animals. This becomes important as expressions that are rather slight in their 
intensity appear as quite difficult to read (Morris 1957), thus, the principle of 
antithesis plays a particularly important role for the contrast between emotions 
and expressive states needs to be apparent. Within animation emotional contrast 
is addressed through the principles of exaggeration, so “[...] if a character was 
to be sad, make him sadder; bright, make him brighter; worried, more worried; 
wilder, make him wilder” (Thomas, Johnston 1981: 66). If the gradedness of 
an emotion is somewhere in-between (e.g. neither pleased nor displeased but 
indifferent) animators would make it pleased or displeased, making the expression 
one of strong valence and pushing it to the end of the spectrum. For example, if a 
character were to receive a gift, they may be pleased and start smiling and pulling 
it closer to them, or if displeased, may frown and push it away. The emphasis 
on exaggerated movements once again highlights the emphasis on the valence 
of actions in animation, which in turn increases the polarity of antithetical 
expressions even more so than in that of a human or animal. 
In conjunction with exaggeration, timing specifically addresses the length and 
speed of a given action (Thomas, Johnston 1981: 64–65). A dramatic movement or 
gesture may be slowed down or an action sped up to add intensity or to manipulate 
the expression of emotional content, e.g. a slowed-down movement could be seen 
as bored or experiencing a state of lethargy, while a similar movement made at a 
great speed could be seen as excited (Whitaker et al. 2009). In conjunction with 
timing, another principle in that of slow in and slow out points out that transitions 
from one movement or expression to another do not happen very rapidly and 
that the transition between expressions is important to avoid a mechanical 
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movement (Thomas, Johnston 1981: 63). It has been shown that individuals 
interpret the emotional expression differently when viewing actions of the same 
movements at different speeds (Pollick et al. 2001). Humans have some control 
of the timing of their emotive expressions such as how a person who does not 
want to go somewhere may “drag their feet” in slowing down their natural pace, 
while an excited person may “pick up their feet” and move at a more rapid pace. 
The degree of control of timing in animation allows for more purposeful control 
of the perceived valence and thus increases the intensity of an expressed emotion 
(Unuma, Takeuchi 1991). In animals, the aspect of timing does not necessarily take 
the same form as it does in animal characters or humans but is rather represented 
as a state of arousal or intensity, e.g. female goats may wag their tail repeatedly in 
states of arousal (Haulenbeek, Katz 2011).
In examining the principles of animation, parallels with Darwin’s principle of 
antithesis can be made. Though they do not mention Darwin specifically, Thomas 
and Johnston (1981) mention the influence of biological theories and echo similar 
discussion points as Darwin. In fact, animation may even place a larger emphasis 
on the concept of antithesis and the exaggeration and increased valence of emotive 
expression as “[...] the disregard of some of the traditional animation principles 
(such as exaggeration, squash and stretch...) could result in a lack of believability 
(i.e. the extent to which a character seems to be alive) in the character” (Beck 2011: 
13). These principles seek to strengthen the valence of an emotional expression, 
which may have its roots in human culture and its tendencies to think in binary 
oppositions (e.g. good-bad, up-down, black-white, etc.; see also Nöth 1994). While 
we have drawn a theoretical connection and parallel between the principles of 
animation and the principle of antithesis in real animals, we need to discuss 
in more detail the role anthropomorphism plays in the expressions of animal 
characters. 
4. Anthropomorphism and emotions
Anthropomorphism, as the attribution of human mental and behavioural 
states to other animals or objects, often has negative connotations (Horowitz, 
Bekoff 2007). We agree that one should be wary of anthropomorphism that is 
inconsiderate of the knowledge that we have of animal umwelten, but we also 
agree that anthropomorphism, in certain cases, may give us better understanding 
of phenomena that are difficult to comprehend and can be useful when it favours 
a biocentric view (see also Maran et al. 2016: 41–42; Martinelli 2010: 170). As 
pertaining to animal-based cartoon characters, one might initially be hesitant to 
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call it ‘anthropomorphism’ and rather be tempted to refer to it as a metaphoric 
relation, i.e. the animal stands in as a substitute for human (Ingold 2000: 91). 
While a cartoon or a story may have a metaphoric intent behind it, it may become 
difficult to draw out the specific intention when characters are viewed in isolation. 
In this way, Disney’s The Lion King6 may tell a coming of age story of an exiled 
child loosely based on Shakespeare’s Hamlet (Gavin 1996) when viewed in entirety, 
but when viewing a clip of Simba in isolation this interpretation is lost. In the same 
way someone viewing a still of Simba may not see him as ‘just a lion’, as, while he 
does share some similarity in the form of a lion, his design rather draws from that 
of the rules of animation (and to a certain extent anthropomorphism) and not the 
principles of the animal world. While many characters may take a metaphorical 
or metonymical (the extension of a human) role (Ingold 2000: 91), the audience 
does not inherently engage with the media/characters as if they were metaphors 
and may even engage with characters as if they were real (Reeves, Nass 1996). 
This disparity between the lack of a biological basis and the potential commu-
nicative functions of these characters requires that we establish an analytical 
framework. To do this we utilize a semiotic typology for the analysis of “artificial 
animals” by Dagmar Schmauks (2000). The proposed typology establishes three 
sign functions for artificial animals, such as animated characters: “[...] artificial 
animals may represent living animals, substitute them in specific contexts, or be 
intended as an improvement of nature” (Schmauks 2000: 309–310). This provides 
us with a foundation from which to examine the purpose and referential basis of 
a given character, so that we may better build upon the communicative intent of 
the character and establish whether the emotive expressions of the character are 
based on a human, an animal, or a species of hybrid nature, which will allow us to 
identify if a species specific of antithetical emotion is present.
Earlier in our discussion, we mention that the body plans of animals of 
the same class may express emotional states in disparate manners (Hediger 
1964[1950]: 111–112). As to expressing emotions in other animals besides 
humans, it is important to stress that we perceive a distinction between attributing 
and recognizing emotions that are analogous to those expressed by humans. 
Again, Hediger has an excellent example of incorrectly attributing a meaning to 
an animal who is not actually expressing an emotion:
6 Th e Lion King 1994. Dir. Rob Minkoff , Roger Allers. Perf. James Earl Jones, Jeremy Irons, 
Jonathan Taylor Th omas. Walt Disney Pictures.
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Th e crocodiles, and their relatives, present the greatest diffi  culties to the observer. 
It is of course a completely mistaken and inadmissible anthropomorphism to say 
that these armoured lizards wear a constant smile on their faces, just because the 
corners of their mouths are turned upwards between their powerful jaws. (Hediger 
1968: 149)
In order to examine animal characters who express similar emotional states but 
reference different species with limited phylogenetic similarity, we will return to 
The Lion King. Both Simba, who represents a lion, and Rafiki, who represents a 
baboon, are used to substitute a human, and we can note that they primarily utilize 
human expressions (i.e. human facial expression and voice). While some lion-like 
and baboon-like characteristics are retained, respectively, their emotional states 
are primarily expressed in very human ways, overriding communicative disparities 
the viewers might have had with their biological referent. Though the artform 
itself affords animators the ability to manipulate the design of a given character 
to aid the viewers in expressive comprehension, it is also important to note the 
importance of similar body plans in animals that allows for the understanding of 
expressed emotions in nature.
There are several instances in which animals belonging to different species, 
yet possessing similar body plans, have similar ways to express similar emotions. 
For example, Darwin observed the behaviour of tamed wolves and jackals in a 
zoological garden, who upon seeing their keeper began to “[...] jump about for joy, 
wag their tails, lower their ears, lick their master’s hands, crouch down, and even 
throw themselves on the ground belly upwards” (Darwin 1872: 125). Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume the overlap between these canine umwelten is large enough 
to allow for the correct interpretation and avoidance of mistakes in the expression 
of (certain) emotions that may take place in interspecies communication. There 
are relatively recent studies that confirm the possibilities of recognizing emotional 
expressions across species, e.g. an experiment conducted with deer (Odocoileus 
virginianus and Odocoileus hemionus) found that deer mothers can recognize 
and will approach the source of distress calls elicited by newborns from other 
mammalian species e.g. seals (Neophoca cinerea and Arctocephalus tropicalis), 
marmots (Marmota flaviventris), humans (Homo sapiens), cats (Felis catus), and 
others (Lingle, Riede 2014). What is especially interesting is that although these 
species might be considered taxonomically and ecologically distant from the deer, 
the overlap in their umwelten proves to be enough for the correct interpretation of 
a given expression of emotion. However, the cry of an infant is an extreme example 
in the sense that this has a strong connection to urgency and is probably one 
of the most intense expressions of emotions found in the animal kingdom – the 
distress call of an infant may also be considered biologically more important to be 
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recognized immediately than, for example, expressions of boredom or surprise. It 
is also important to note that in the case of animal characters the majority of them 
have similar body plans, e.g. four legs; an upright stance (i.e. ‘human-like’ bodies).
We would like to stress that the body plan similarity of biological animals 
belonging to the same class (e.g. mammals), which may happen as described above 
does not guarantee that emotional states are consequently expressed in a similar 
manner. Hediger (1964[1950]: 111–112) describes an instance that is excellent 
for illustrating how the differences in umwelten and thus, in communicative 
capabilities, may lead to miscommunication about the expressions of emotion. 
The anecdotal case describes how a red kangaroo and a stag of a similar size shared 
an enclosure, and any time the kangaroo sat up “[…] the stag would go for him, 
rearing itself right up on its hindquarters and thrashing the completely inoffensive 
kangaroo until he squatted down again on his haunches” (Hediger 1964[1950]: 
112). From the point of view of the kangaroo’s umwelt, sitting up does (most 
probably) not entail any expression of emotional state – it is just that the body 
plan of the kangaroo is such, that his/her front legs are unable to touch the ground 
in a sitting position. For the stag, however, the raised front legs are perceived 
as an expression of a mental state, which carries a negative emotional valence 
(e.g. an expression of an emotion indicating aggression or anger), requiring the 
immediate action of attack. This is a clear example that the information needed 
for social communication is misinterpreted in various instances of interspecies 
communication, stemming from the incompatibility of umwelten. 
Similarly, we may assume that a puppy who is not accustomed to cats might 
misinterpret a cat’s defensive posture combined with tail wagging as an emotion 
resembling joy or happiness. This situation will most probably result in the cat 
hissing and maybe even attacking the dog. However, it is widely acknowledged that 
learning from each other (e.g. from a mother or a peer) is essential, especially in 
social animals, and thus animals from different species can learn to identify each 
other’s emotional cues correctly as is the case with cats and dogs that have been 
brought up in the same household. Additionally, there are cases in which animals 
from different populations of the same species express the same state of mind in 
different manners, e.g. langur monkeys in Northern and Southern India carry 
their tails arched over the back or looping backward, respectively, to communicate 
confidence (Sebeok 1990). From these examples we can conclude that the ability to 
communicate one’s emotional state effectively presumes a code that is understood 
by both parties during communication, i.e. there must be shared meaning. 
The examples of the kangaroo and the stag or the cat and the dog demonstrate 
the importance of correctly interpreting the expressions of emotions in diffe-
rent animals’ umwelten. The same precaution is pertinent to those studying 
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animal emotions; as “[e]xternally, very similar behaviours can be produced by 
fundamentally different internal mechanisms” (Kull 2018), which is why the 
whole context of a given communicational situation should be accounted for. 
Such carefulness in the approach should also be maintained when dealing with 
machines designed to imitate the emotional expressions of animals, for example a 
Roomba with a ‘dog’s tail’ which can be wagged, raised, lowered, or straightened 
to refer to different emotions (Singh, Young 2012). This does not take into account 
that a dog uses his/her entire body, not just the tail, to express emotions, and 
that the dog actually has emotions as such to express. As a crude metaphor, it 
would be comprehensible if the Roomba was ‘happy’ once it has finished its 
work, and e.g. ‘attentive’ when waiting for work, but it remains elusive, why it 
should be ‘angry’, ‘suspicious’, ‘anxious’, or imitate any other kind of mental state 
accompanied by those positions of a dog tail. However, this animal-inspired robot 
serves as a good example of displaced zoomorphism (if zoomorphism is usually 
defined as animals considering humans to be their conspecifics (e.g. Hediger 
1964[1950]: 164–165), which could be also viewed as the attribution of other 
species-specific characteristics to humans, then in this case it is manifested as 
attributing the characteristics of other animals to things). In the case of animated 
animal characters we are not only limited to the use of anthropomorphism, but 
zoomorphism is often incorporated by animators into retaining elements of the 
animal referent in the behavioural expression of the character. It then becomes 
of interest to explore the outcome of these mixed modalities in the emotional 
expression and examine in greater detail how antithesis is presented by animal 
characters. Below, we offer a case study looking at the expression of an animal 
character to examine the presence of antithesis within an applied context.
 
5. Case study
In order to investigate the presence of antithesis in animal characters we utilize a 
joint methodology. First, we classify the sign function of the animal (Schmauks 
2000) so that we can better determine the communicative intent behind the 
animal character and explore from what perspective we should focus on the 
expressive elements of antithesis present (e.g. a more human antithesis, a more 
animal antithesis, or one of a hybrid nature). Then we describe the character 
using Thomas and Johnston’s (1981: 537–547) format for analysing the emotive 
expression of a character, which has us first look at the overall design of a character 
and its elements before exploring how specific emotions are expressed. For the 
purposes of this analysis we will limit our focus more generally to the eight paired 
primary emotions offered by Plutchik (1980) in his wheel of emotions. 
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5.1. Typology
The character analysed is Poppy the Hedgehog (Fig. 1), a supporting character 
in the children’s animation Gigglebug. “The stories are set in the oh-so enchanted 
Greengown Forest, where Gigglebug meets his young animal friends, all dealing 
with growing up. The series is heartfelt, warm, and safe, and best of all, a bunch 
of giggles!” (Gigglebug Entertainment)7. We chose to analyse a character from 
this series as it is a currently produced series enjoying a growing popularity that 
uses hand-drawn frame-by-frame animation similar to the techniques used at the 
time when the principles of animation were developed. We chose this character 
based on our knowledge of and access to its biological referent, hedgehog. Poppy 
is described by the series creators as “[...] airy, dreamy, whimsical, excitable, 
innocent, and bursts into tears easily” (Gigglebug Entertainment). From this 
initial information we can determine that Poppy is a representation of a hedgehog 
used to substitute a human. The substitution in general is intended metaphorically 
(Ingold 2000: 91), as the characters in the show are rather meant to offer didactic 
lessons to young viewers. From this we could assume the likelihood of the 
presence of expressions that align with those of a human antithesis. Still, the 
general construction of the character should be reviewed to see what degree of 
anthropomorphism is utilized.
Figure 1. Character sheet of Poppy the Hedgehog (Gigglebug Entertainment). 
7 Gigglebug Entertainment. Gigglebug. Available at http://www.gigglebug.tv/ (Accessed 10 
February 2018). 
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5.2 General construction
A. Body/Movement: The design of Poppy is expressed as a circular silhouette 
composed of a more oblong, bipedal body with most of her frame made up of 
her ‘hair’, which represents the quills of a biological hedgehog. This hair takes a 
rounded, ball-like shape that also acts as a support that suspends her body when 
in place (see Fig. 1). Her hair will also squash or stretch along with her positioning 
and movements. In terms of general movement, she will switch from moving with 
her feet on the ground for larger movements and walking, but she will remain 
with her legs suspended for shorter movements. Her posture resembles more of a 
hedgehog placed on his/her back (Fig. 2) as compared to one on all fours. Overall, 
the representation can be identified as rather anthropomorphic, and bodily 
expressions would then be expected to rather align with those of a human.
  
Figure 2. Tequila the hedgehog on 
his back (photo provided by Chase 
Tiffany).
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B. Voice: No direct human speech is used, but she utters a series of grunts, laughs, 
and sighs performed by a female voice actor, which accompany movements and 
gesticulations. This contrasts with that of a natural hedgehog who rather makes 
more sniffling snorts, or screeching sounds when under distress (Tynes 2010: 
169–170). While stylized vocal expressions are used, we can see a clear usage 
of human expressions, and thus we can rule out the usage of a species-specific 
auditory antithesis.
The differences between the animal referent and the representation caused 
by the exclusion of biological hedgehog elements are likely meant to aid in the 
appeal and readability of the emotional states of the character. Since some species 
of hedgehogs have been domesticated, there is some public awareness of the 
expressive and sensational states of hedgehogs (Tynes 2010: 168). In this way we 
can generally clarify the typology of Poppy to be: (1) representing a hedgehog; (2) 
metaphorically substituting a human; and (3) improving upon the referent of a 
hedgehog through the heavy anthropomorphizing of the design and vocalizations. 
This means that in analysing the expressive gestures for the presence of antithesis, 
we primarily need to look at the emotional expressions of humans. 
5.3. Handling emotive expression
In order to examine the emotive expressions used for the animation of Poppy, 
we reviewed a series of clips available on the Gigglebug Youtube Channel8. As 
instances of exact emotions are often context-specific (Anderson, Adolph 2014), 
we focused on instances in which the highest positive or negative valences were 
expressed, as these may result in the highest degree of emotional expression 
(Morris 1957). We focused on the following pairings: sadness-happiness; anger-
fear; surprise-anticipation; trust-disgust. No instances of perceived disgust could 
be found within the available clips, so an antithetical comparison was not available 
for trust. Descriptions of the physical and vocal elements of the character in each 
of these emotions are expressed in Table 1. It is also important to note that these 
expressions of emotion are multimodal in nature and that we have broken them 
down into separate pieces, which, when combined together, contribute to the 
whole bodily expression.
8 Th e youtube channel and analysed videos can be found here: https://www.youtube.com/
channel/UCBnDO41douBqsGK72rjppyQ.
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Table 1. Breakdown of emotive gestures in Poppy the Hedgehog.
 Squash or 
tretch  
Limb 
positioning 
Facial 
pression  
Voice Secondary 
actions 
Timing/
 
Valence 
Anger Stretch  Arms 
downward, 
closed fist 
Eyes 
squinted, 
mouth 
closed/lip 
pout 
Low 
pitched 
grunt or 
growl, 
lower pitch 
Stomp/ 
downward 
thrust 
Slowed 
movement 
Negative 
Fear Squash Arms 
brough to 
chest, 
tightened 
body 
posture 
Eyes 
widened, 
pupils 
dilated 
Soft 
whimper or 
no sound 
Freezing or 
stopping of 
secondary 
actions 
Slowed 
 
Negative 
Happiness  Stretch Arms open 
outward, 
head turned 
upwards 
Eyes 
closed or 
squinting 
Laughter 
sound, 
higher 
pitch 
Cheering, 
or 
accompany
ing 
laughing 
gestures 
Quick to 
normal 
may 
overlap 
with 
excitement 
Positive 
Sadness Squash Arms and 
legs pulled 
inwards  
Pupils 
dilated, 
frown 
Whimper 
sounds  
Tears, 
wiping 
eyes, curl 
up to more 
ball shape* 
Slowed 
 
Negative 
Surprise Stretch Arms and 
legs both 
spread 
outward, 
head 
moved 
backwards 
Pupils 
contracted, 
open moth  
Ingressive 
gasp  
No  Quick 
movement 
Positive/ 
 
Anti
 
Squash Hunched 
over, arms 
brought 
inwards 
Eyes more 
dilated 
Outward 
hum or no 
sound 
Movement 
of hands 
Slowed 
movement 
Positive/ 
 
Trust Squash Relaxed 
arms put 
together 
Eyes 
closed, 
small smile 
No sound No Normal 
movement 
Positive 
Disgust NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
s ex
movement
-
movement
negative
negativecipation
-
speed
Overall, a wide degree of exaggeration was used in the expression of emotions, 
very few low-intensity expressions were present and rather a strong degree of 
intensity was utilized in the general expression of emotions. Follow through and 
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overlapping actions were rather used to change the intensity or the valence of the 
character’s emotive expression (see Fig. 3). Although in the case of trust, it tended 
to have a lower degree of intensity than the other emotions and had some overlap 
with expression of happiness. 
In the pairs we saw opposite squash and stretch in the bodies and limbs: during 
the expression of surprise, happiness, and anger the body position of the character 
stretched, accompanied by outward extension of the limbs, while in the case of 
anger, the limbs were stretched downward. As to the proposed opposites of these 
emotions (fear, sadness, anticipation), we saw a degree of squashing and retraction 
of the limbs. In the same vein, a degree of antithesis was found in eye movements 
during expressions. When surprised, Poppy’s eyes would open wide and her pupils 
would contract, whereas when experiencing anticipation, we saw narrowing of the 
eyes and dilation of the pupils. This degree of difference was less clear in case of 
other emotions, as in both sadness and happiness the character’s eyes were closed 
in either laughter or tears, respectively. We identified no clear degree of difference 
in the character’s voice based on the emotional pairings.
Concerning secondary actions, it is much less clear whether the secondary 
actions accompanying an emotional expression were antithetical in opposite 
expressions, but it was clear that the accompanying actions seemed to increase 
the intensity of the overall expression. In terms of the timing and speed of gestures 
and sounds in comparing happiness-sadness and surprise-anticipation, we could 
see that happiness and surprise tended to induce more rapid movements than 
sadness or anticipation. While some clear examples of antithesis were seen in the 
expression of the squash or stretch of the body and limbs of the character, a clear 
antithesis was less apparent for the other expressive elements we examined. It is 
important to emphasize the multimodal expression of emotion and the need to 
look at the intensity and valence of the overall expression. Regarding valence, 
we could see that some emotions take an overall opposite valence. For example, 
‘happiness’ took a positive valence, while its paired opposites ‘sadness’ took a 
negative valence. In the instances of surprise-anticipation, it was more difficult 
to narrow down the particular valence of a given action as there were instances 
in which the anticipation-surprise took a positive valence (e.g. anticipation for 
something exciting would have a positive valence, while anticipation could also be 
negative in the case of anxiety). As mentioned above, the valence of an expression 
is very important, but it is not always enough to describe the complexity of an 
emotion. In the case of surprise-anticipation much of the valence is determined by 
an individual’s response to the preceding or upcoming events, making these acts 
more as a transitional emotion of sorts. This once again highlights the importance 
of paying attention to the context of the overall expression. Returning to Darwin’s 
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examples where he contrasted an aggressive and a loving expression of the dog, the 
emotions themselves were not opposite, but their valences were exactly opposite. 
When viewing the expressions of anger and fear within the character, both had 
negative valences, so they would not be viewed as antithetical. Despite an initial 
analysis stemming from the principles of animation, the relation between valence 
and intensity in the multimodal expression of emotions in animated animal 
characters holds the same relationship as in that of animals. 
Figure 3. Character sheet of Poppy the Hedgehog with general expressions and gesticulations 
(Gigglebug Entertainment).
Conclusion
In order to discover what techniques are utilized to create an expressive function 
in animated characters, we established a parallel between Darwin’s antithesis and 
the principles of animation. Antithetical forms used in the animation of characters 
play an important communicative function between animal cartoon characters and 
human viewers in particular, with animation placing additional emphasis on the 
valence and intensity of an action. The principles of animation play an important 
role in animation as a whole; thus, in our analysis of these principles through the 
lens of ethnological and anthropological zoosemiotics, we have established how 
these fundamental principles can be further analysed and expanded upon.
In drawing comparisons between the forms of animal characters and real 
animals we have additionally identified a few key points. When compared to 
the expression of antithetical expressions in animals, we can see that, in general, 
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animation draws more on the expressive forms of humans as opposed to their 
biological referents (i.e. animal characters are largely anthropomorphic in their 
conception). However, it would be misguided to say that these characters draw 
solely on human expressions, as there is a degree of zoomorphism incorporated 
into the initial design and expression of these characters. We have also noted that 
in both the design of characters, as well as in real animals, a given individual’s 
body plan plays an important role in aiding the communication of affective 
states. In the case of animals, there is a tendency for animals with more similar 
body plans to have a greater ease of interspecies communication, although even 
within a species with similar umwelten, different populations may still have mis-
communications. In animal characters the key features of a character’s design 
will often be manipulated to aid in overall communication; this is not limited to 
attributing a human voice to a character or making it bipedal, but also includes 
subtler changes, such as the placement of facial features and the elasticity, or 
rigidness, of the body and face during expressions. 
Awareness of the biological concepts that govern emotional expression in real 
animals, as scrutinized in this article, can offer animators a starting point in the 
creation and analysis of their characters. In our analysis of Poppy the Hedgehog 
we offered a new approach for the analysis of animal characters, which combined 
zoosemiotic theories (Shmauks’ typology of artificial animals, Uexküll’s concept 
of umwelt, and Darwin’s antithesis) with the character analysis approach offered 
by Thomas and Johnston. This joint approach affords a structure in which 
animators can better understand their innate decisions in character design. This 
could also offer a means for animators to identify the multimodal aspects of a 
character’s expressions more effetively, so that these could be improved to make 
the character more engaging and expressive. It can be claimed that Darwin’s 
concepts surrounding the principle of antithesis and the expression of emotion 
still hold ground in modern theoretical discourse and offer a fruitful connection 
and application within the field of animation and character design. 9
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Пересмотренный принцип антитезы Дарвина – 
зоосемиотический взгляд на выражение эмоций у животных и 
анимационных персонажей животных
В анимации и дизайне персонажей мультфильмов аниматоры часто обращаются к 
био ло гическим теориям и наблюдению за актерами-людьми и животными, чтобы 
более точно воспроизвести движения и эмоции. Чарльз Дарвин считал принцип анти-
тезы одним из принципов, отвечавших за выражение эмоций у животных. Как нам 
представляется, этот принцип антитезы имеет особое значение в развитии анимации. 
Пересматривая первоначальную идею Дарвина в контексте принципов анимации, 
сформулированных Томасом и Джонстоном, мы можем оценить ее применение и 
актуальность при выражении эмоций у мультипликационных животных. Статья 
концент рируется на эмотивной функции в социальной коммуникации животных, 
как это описано в зоосемиотике, принимая во внимание, что выражения персонажей 
животных направлены на зрителя мультфильма. Принцип антитезы как описательный 
инструмент помогает нам в рассмотрении разнообразия методов, используемых 
одновременно в аффективной коммуникации, и позволяет объяснить человеческие 
интерпретации антропоморфных и зооморфных проекций в поведении анимационных 
персонажей животных. Эта статья дает представление о возможной экспансии и 
переоценке принципов анимации, которые могут быть использованы аниматорами для 
создания более динамичных и выразительных анимационных персонажей животных.
Darwini antitees – zoosemiootiline perspektiiv loomade ja 
joonisfi lmi loomadetegelaste emotsioonide väljendamisele
Joonisfilmide loomtegelaste animeerimisel ja disainimisel on animaatorid sageli kasutanud 
bioloogiliste teooriate uurimist ja inimeste ning loomade vaatlemist, et paremini tabada elu 
jäljendavaid liikumisi ja emotsioone. Charles Darwini antitees – üks põhimõtetest, mida ta 
pidas vastutavaks loomade emotsioonide väljendamise eest – näib olevat animatsioonis erilise 
tähtsusega. Käsitledes Darwini algset ideed Thomasi ja Johnstoni animatsioonipõhimõtete 
kontekstis, suudame hinnata selle rakendamist ja asjakohasust joonisfilmides kujutatud loomade 
emotsioonide väljendamisel. Artiklis keskendutakse loomade sotsiaalse kommunikatsiooni 
emotiivsele funktsioonile, nagu seda on kirjeldatud zoosemiootikas, ja võetakse ühtlasi arvesse, 
et joonisfilmide loomtegelaste väljendus on suunatud vaatajatele. Antiteesi kui kirjeldava 
tööriista põhimõte aitab meil võtta arvesse afektiivses kommunikatsioonis samaaegselt kasu ta-
tavate kanalite mitmekesisust. Samuti aitab antitees selgitada inimeste poolt antavaid tõlgendusi 
joonisfilmide loomategelaste käitumise antropomorfsetele ja zoomorfsetele mõõdetele. Artikkel 
pakub võimaluse defineerimata animatsioonipõhimõtete laiendamiseks ja ümberhindamiseks, 
mida animaatorid saavad kasutada dünaamilisemate ja väljendusrikkamate loomtegelaste 
loomisel joonisfilmides.
